

At-issueness in direct quotation: the case of Mayan quotatives

I. Introduction: In addition to *verba dicendi*, languages have several other grammatical devices for encoding reported speech. While not common in Indo-European languages, two of the most common such elements cross-linguistically are reportative evidentials and quotatives (henceforth, REP and QUOT). QUOT have been much less discussed than *verba dicendi* or REP, both in descriptive/typological literature and especially in formal semantic work. While QUOT haven't been formally analyzed in detail previously to my knowledge, several recent works on reported speech constructions in general have suggested in passing that they pattern either with *verba dicendi* or with REP. For example, Bary & Maier (2018) claim that QUOT are a specific kind of speech report similar to those with *verba dicendi*, while works such as Krawczyk (2012) and Korotkova (2015) regard QUOT and REP as being quite similar. In this paper, we draw on data from QUOT in Mayan languages, (1), to show that QUOT (at least in this case) are distinct from both, and argue for a bicontextualist account of QUOT.

II. Quotatives and reportatives in Mayan languages: Although the empirical situation is less clear in the Eastern subfamily, other Mayan languages have been shown to have QUOT and REP with mostly consistent properties (Lucy (1993), López Jiménez (2010), Curiel (2016), AnderBois (t.a.)). We draw here on naturalistic and elicited data from Yucatec Maya (YM) *ki(j)* QUOT and *bin* REP. In terms of form, *bin* REP is a prosodically integrated enclitic particle which can occur at any prosodic word boundary, taking semantic scope over the whole sentence in all cases. While the original speaker with *bin* REP can happen to be salient in discourse and therefore anaphoric, the original speaker can also be indefinite 'I've heard' or generic 'they say'. In contrast, *ki(j)* QUOT is prosodically unintegrated, being preceded and followed by a significant pause and occurring primarily in utterance-final position. Although the original speaker and addressee are overtly encoded, *ki(j)* QUOT is unlike ordinary verbs in YM in how they are encoded (as absolutive and dative arguments respectively) and in lacking aspectual and other obligatory verbal morphology.

III. Differentiating QUOT from other reported speech: Beyond these formal differences, we argue for two semantic properties distinguishing QUOT from REP and *verba dicendi*.

IIIa — QUOT involve direct quotation, REP do not: QUOT have often been regarded as evidentials and authors such as Korotkova (2015) have argued that certain non-declarative uses of REP should be analyzed as QUOT. As the name 'quotative' suggests, however QUOT in Mayan languages do indeed involve direct quotation. This can be seen by the shift in deictic expressions such as first and second person pronouns, (2), as well as the consistent shifts in all other speaker-oriented content such as vocatives (1), predicates of personal taste, and discourse particles (not shown). Furthermore, while interrogative and imperative sentences with YM *bin* REP in Mayan languages license the same range of responses by the addressee in discourse as counterparts with no reported speech device, corresponding sentences with QUOT typically elicit no response from the actual addressee and can be said to uniformly contribute a speech act of 'dialogue narration' instead. Instead, interrogatives and imperatives with QUOT have their effect upon another actor within the story itself, as in (2).

IIIb — QUOT involve conventional not-at-issueness, *verba dicendi* do not: One hallmark of illocutionary evidentials like YM *bin* REP is that the speech report is semantically not-at-issue, with the content of the report is obligatorily at-issue (e.g. Faller (2002),

Matthewson et al. (2007), Murray (2017)). QUOT show the same at-issueness divide, as supported by evidence such as the range of QUDs to which they felicitously respond, (3), and the interpretation of unmarked responses akin to English ‘yes’ and ‘no’, (4). Related to this, QUOT (and REP in Mayan) differ from verba dicendi in that the quoted material must be overt with QUOT, rather than being anaphorically provided (cf. English ‘He said it/that.’).

IV. A bicontextualist analysis of QUOT: Having shown that the reported speech component of QUOT is not-at-issue with QUOT, we are left with a puzzle: how can the quoted *linguistic material* behave as at-issue *content*? Moreover, we find that while the actual addressee cannot respond to an utterance containing QUOT using unmarked means like ‘yes’ and ‘no’, (4b), it is quite common for another quoted individual within a narrative to do so, (4b’), and for the actual speaker to make use of a QUOT in their report of this. The basic generalization, then, is that the quoted material that co-occurs with QUOT uniformly behaves like a normal matrix utterance including in its illocutionary potential, response particles, etc. It simply does so within another context within the universe of the narrative, rather than in the actual context. Since we deal with response particles here, we propose extending Farkas & Bruce (2010)’s scoreboard semantics for responses like ‘yes’ and ‘no’ by allowing for the possibility that speakers narrating a story, such as Venustiano in (1), can establish in-narrative scoreboards, as below. QUOT conventionally mark the quoted content as contributing to such a scoreboard and additionally help fix the speaker and hearer arguments in it:

Discourse update for (1): (p is the proposition that Don Miro was not a slave)

Actual Scoreboard $\{V,C\}$			In-narrative scoreboard $\{M,S\}$		
	Table $_{\{V,C\}}$			Table $_{\{M,S\}}$ p	
DC_V $say(M, p)$	CG $_{\{V,C\}}$	DC_C	DC_{M}} p	CG $_{\{M,S\}}$	DC_S

V. Conclusions: Whereas previous literature has often regarded QUOT as being a special kind of verbum dicendi or REP, we argue that they involve direct quotation but nonetheless encode a similar at-issueness distinction to REP. The emergent typology of reported speech constructions is seen in the chart on the right. While we analyze QUOT as contributing moves which update non-actual contexts, we do not assume that all quotation is of this sort. Rather, we conclude – as Bary & Maier (2018) do for indirect speech – that natural language provides two different forms of direct speech reports.

	At-issue	Not-at-issue
Indirect	x said that p	REPORTATIVES
Direct	x said “...”	☆QUOTATIVES☆

While it seems clear that certain types of quotation cannot be analyzed in this way (e.g. mixed quotation), we might well wonder about certain other cases. For example, Eckardt (2015)’s account of Free Indirect Discourse relies on a closely related form of bicontextualism for the Common Ground. Although we do not provide an account of Free Indirect Discourse here, by identifying an element which conventionally indicates this sort of shift, we offer a useful point of comparison. Another question the account raises is whether languages which lack dedicated quotatives, like English, nonetheless have forms which involve similar bicontextualism. While we leave a full account to future work, we give suggestive evidence for two such constructions: (i) preposed quotations with verba dicendi (e.g. “Go!”, *he said.*) and (ii) invariant *says* in non-standard varieties of English (e.g. *I says to him “Go!”*).

- (1) **Context:** Venustiano is telling a true story to a researcher, César. He introduces a person in the story, Don Miro, an old man talking to his children, including Salvador. The story then continues with his children talking to Don Miro, who responds:

-Ten=e', paal-e'ex, ten=e' ma' j-oken ti' esclavitud=i' —*ki*
 I=TOP child=B2PL I=TOP NEG PFV-ENTER PREP slavery=NEG.CL

‘“I, children, I wasn’t a slave.” he said.’ *Maayáaj tsikbalilo’ob kaampech*, p. 136

- (2) a. -Hijo,- *ken* ti', -buka'aj le tikin muuk a meentmaj-e'ex=o'?
 son QUOT.B1SG DAT.3SG how.many DEF dry seed A2 do-A2PL=DIST

‘“Son,” I said to him, “how many dry plantings did you do?”’

- b. To'on=e'-, *ki*, -casi veinte yaale'.
 we=TOP QUOT.BS3G almost twenty ??

‘“Us”, he said, “almost 20 units of land”.’ *Narraciones mayas*, p. 275

- (3) Yaan wáay t-u kaj-il espita —*ki* teen
 EXIST ghost PREP-A3 town-REL espita QUOT.B3SG DAT.1SG

‘“There’s ghosts in Espita” —he says to me.’

- a. ✓ **Scope-at-issue QUD:** Are there ghosts in Espita?

- b. ✗ **Report-at-issue QUD:** What did Luis say?

- (4a) Bobi'=e' u k'áat káa lúub-uk le bak'=o' —*ki*.
 Bobby=TOP A3 want for fall-SUBJ DEF meat=DIST -QUOT.B3SG

He goes “Bobby (a dog) wants the meat to fall”

- (4b) # {Jaaj // ma' jaaj=i'} (4b') {Jaaj -*ken* // ma' jaaj=i' -*ken*}
 true NEG true=NEG true QUOT.B1SG NEG true=NEG QUOT.B1SG
 Intended: ‘Yes.’ // ‘No.’ ‘I’m like {“Yes” // “No”}.’

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